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SCRIPTURE AS WORD OF GOD:
EVANGELICAL ASSUMPTION OR EVANGELICAL
QUESTION?
JOHN D. MORRISON"
Within historical and modern evangelical orthodox Christian
contexts it is all but assumed that when reference is made to "the
Word of God" it is Holy Scripture that is intended; and that in spite
of evangelical Christocentricity and the fact of "the Word made
flesh." Modern evangelicalism, across the traditions, has consistently
maintained the propriety of the claim that Holy Scripture is the
written or, more recently, "inscripturated" Word of God, whatever
else may rightly and more directly be identified as the Word of God.
Indeed, much of evangelical theological identity, and its
Christocentricity, is grounded in the confessional linkage whereby
Scripture is the written Word of God.
Yet this contention cannot be regarded as confined only to
modern evangelicalism. Historians of Christian theology have
repeatedly pointed out, often with scorn, that this textual
identification or connection of Word or revelation of God with Holy
Scripture is the almost universal position of the church fathers and
pre-Christian Judaism.! Historically, post-Nicene, medieval (East
and West), Reformation, and post-Reformation Catholic and
Protestant Christianity has held the same position-despite
historical, ecclesiological, conceptual, and methodological shifts and
developments. In fact, the often predominant position of church
fathers and doctors, and on occasion the Reformers, was not simply
that Scripture is or can be rightly identified as the written Word of
God but that this very process meant essentially divine dictation of
the books of Scripture. While such an extreme "docetic" view has
been disavowed almost unanimously in modem evangelicalism, the
central contention about the revelatory character of Scripture has
'John D. Morrison is Professor of Theological Studies at Liberty University in
Lynchburg, Virginia.
!Cf. J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (New York: Hayser and Row, 1960)
chaps. 2, 3; Bruce Shelley, By What Authority? (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965);
Geoffrey W. Bromiley, "The Church Fathers and Holy Scripture," in Scripture and
Truth (ed. D. A. Carson and John Woodbridge; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1983); John
D. Woodbridge, Biblical Authority: A Critique of the Rogers/McKim Proposal (Grand
Rapids: Zondervan, 1982). This is a position acknowledged by Pinnock but skirted by
Bloesch and Fackre.
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continued to be basic. But it is this very point of identification that
has in recent years been carefully and subtly denied by theologians
who claim the label" evangelical."
In order to bring preliminary clarity to the claims, issues,
questions, and criticisms, as well as constructive reformulation,
several points regarding evangelical assessment of Scripture and
contemporary developments ought to be made. By thus identifying
Scripture as the written Word of God, the claim is then that God has
revealed himself historically in acts, centrally and supremely in Jesus
Christ. It also means that God has revealed himself personally to
persons to redeem them; that God has revealed himself "contentfully," i.e., that God's self-disclosure is not fully given in a bare Act
of power (e.g., Exodus) nor in dramatic, but conceptually empty,
"will-O'-the-wisp" personal encounters, but "content-fully" in ways
effectually expressible in and as human language, even written
language. The theological result is not merely a Scripture that points
to the Word of God (Christ), like John the Baptist in the Griinewald
altarpiece,2 nor a Scripture that "becomes" the Word and which the
Word of God breaks through in order to meet us as "1 to Thou," 3 nor
a Scripture that "brings" or "conveys" the Word of God to us; nor
even a Scripture "in which" the Word of God can be found
somewhere. Instead, the evangelical position on revelation is an
understanding of Holy Scripture as the inscripturated Word of God,
whatever may be its other Spirit-effected roles in relation to the
redemptive self-disclosure of God (d. below). However we reckon
Scripture's unitary connectedness to, in, and under Christ the Word,
by the Spirit, the historic evangelical position emphasizes the reality
of the participation of Scripture within the economy of God's
gracious, condescending self-giving, to be known objectively and
redemptively as he is in himself in the world. The point is that at
some level Scripture-as-Scripture is (ontologically) Word of God. The
evangelical position, like the historical position of the church, is not
fearful of or repulsed by the participation of the divine in the human,
the material, even in the linguistic (at the level of the text).
But within evangelicalism there is a subtle and nuanced move
away from this identification of Word of God and Holy Scripture at
any level, except perhaps in a formal" adoptionist" or "Arian" sense.
Whether correct or incorrect, these recent attempts to cut the divine
Word of God free from the written text of Scripture are conceptually
and methodologically reflective of the re-entrenchment of dualistic
thinking which, in theology, inevitably bifurcates the unity of God's
2This was a favorite illustration of Barth's for the role of Scripture in relation to
Christ. The picture has John pointing to the crucified Christ, thus bearing "witness to
him." A copy of the Gruenewald altarpiece hung just above Barth's desk at his home
in Basel.
3Such "personalistic" emphasis, via the influence of Jewish existentialist Martin
Buber, has played a prominent role in concepts of divine revelation in this century,
especially, e.g., in the thought of Emil Brunner, John Bailie, and to a lesser extent in
Barth and Thomas Torrance.
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redemptive-kingdom purposes by cutting off the objective
knowledge of God in the world. It is the purpose here to present,
analyze, and critique three recent evangelical discussions of Holy
Scripture in relation to revelation/Word of God, and to present a
Christocentric revelational model wherein participative place is
found for written human language in and as Word of God.
I. THREE RECENT FORMULATIONS OF THE SCRIPTURE-WORD
OF GOD RELA TIONSHIP
A. Donald Bloesch

Donald Bloesch has long been an insightful, intelligent, and
effective evangelical theological light in the midst of mainline
Protestant theology. A combination of theological acumen and
humble, faithful, Reformed piety is found throughout his works.4 In
recent years Bloesch has embarked on an extensive theological
project entitled Christian Foundations, already well-known and much
used in evangelical seminaries and colleges. In the second volume,
Holy Scripture: Revelation, Inspiration and Interpretation, Bloesch
endeavors to walk the via media between what he sees as the
theological pitfalls of (inerrantist) fundamentalism and liberalism on
the question of Holy Scripture. This dialectical structuring of what
he perceives to be extreme against extreme is found on nearly every
page of the work.
But the concern here is the relation of Scripture to Word of God,
and thus biblical authority in a primary sense. Again, one cannot
really trace out Bloesch's position without seeing those dialectical
relations within which he sets his view. Yet even here the point is not
immediately clear. In addition to following James Barr's critique of a
largely straw man "fundamentalism," and so lumping, e.g., Carl
Henry, Millard Erickson, and J. I. Packer together as advocates of a
"rationalistic neo-fundamentalism,"s he also chides neo-orthodoxy
and liberalism, claiming for his own position the high ground of the
title "evangelical." How then is this reflected in his assessment of the
character and authority of Scripture?
Against what he esteems to be the "frozen truth" of orthodoxy
and its "docetic" view of Scripture, Bloesch sees the need to recover
the "paradoxical unity of Word and Spirit" and a highly dynamic
conception of the self-disclosure of God in Christ. To this end, he
says, we must distinguish between the "transcendent content" of
divine revelation and its historical form (Jesus) and any sense of
Scripture as "written Word of God," i.e., as witness to the truth
revealed in Christ, and as the "living Word" which it "becomes"
4E.g., The Struggle of Prayer, Wellsprings of Renewal, The Crisis of Piety, and others,
alon&; with works directly related to "doctrinal" theology.
Donald G. Bloesch, Holy Scripture: Revelation, Inspiration and Interpretation
(Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1994) 65-7, 94-101.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

168

TRINITY JOURNAL

when it actually communicates the truth and power of Christ to us
by the Spirit.6 Indeed, these could be useful points of distinction in
seeking to understand God's self-disclosure. But what Bloesch
intends in terms of Scripture's relation to "Word of God" is largely
fashioned in the dialogical relation he maintains throughout with the
"dialectical theology movement," or "neo-orthodoxy," and with Karl
Barth and Emil Brunner in particular. In terms of criticism, the
following statement is both telling and ironic:
Neo-orthodoxy ... while calling for a recovery of biblical authority,
was unable to hold together the divine and the human sides of
Scripture. It can be faulted for fostering a Nestorian approach to the
Bible in which the divine word and human word are only loosely
associated and never function in indissoluble unity?

Elsewhere Bloesch says that:
For Barth the Bible is the Word of God because ... [the] work of
God is done through this text. ... Every word or proposition in the
Bible when taken in and of itself and when divorced from God's
truth is open to error. At the same time, when united to the divine
Word [i.e., Christ], the living, transcendent center of the Bible, it is
then a bearer of the transcendent ... the potential of being a vehicle
of divine grace.8

It is here, says Bloesch, that neo-orthodoxy advanced beyond

"fundamentalism," i.e., by its "sharp distinction between Scripture
as a historical and literary document and divine revelation."9
Bloesch, following Barth especially, understands God's
revelation to be objective truth and event, focused primarily on
God's self-disclosure in Jesus Christ. But it refers also to the dynamic
and effectual meaning and significance of Christ. 10 Does this latter
element refer to Scripture via the process of "inspiration"? No.
Bloesch all but passes by classic passages such as 2 Tim 3:16; 2 Pet
1:20-21, etc., while defining "inspiration" dynamically after Barth's
own pattern, which emphasizes primarily the ever presentness of
inspiration by the enactment of the Spirit. To this are joined other
elements reflecting both his concern for existential encounter with
God's transcendent Word and his antipathy to any "static"
identification between the transcendent Word/Truth of God and the
historical, cultural, human witness to that Word, i.e., Holy
Scripture. l l

6lbid., 24-5.
7lbid., 33.
8lbid., 101-2.
9lbid.
lOlbid., 49ff.
lllbid., 117f., 126f.
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Yet Bloesch does not take a straightforward "Barthian" position.
Contra Barth's clear distinction between Scripture text and Word of
God, Bloesch's position is more nuanced. Thus he says,
The content of the Bible is indeed God's self-revelation in Jesus
Christ, but this content comes to us in the form of a historical
witness to this event or constellation of events. To know this
content we need to get beyond "the right human thoughts about
God [i.e., Scripture)" to "the right divine thoughts about men" [i.e.,
"Word," quote from Barth] .... [The Scriptures] now function as
the vehicle of the Holy Spirit . . . [by whom we become]
contemporaneous with the moment of revelation ... through the
word that we hear. The Bible is not in and of itself the revelation of
God but the divinely appointed means and channel of this
revelation.1 2
Since, for Bloesch, the "Word of God transcends the human
witness," the "human word," it is not surprising that he must
caricature what has been understood as the "evangelical" or
"historical orthodox" position, claiming that its representatives
identify the scriptural writings as the "stenographic notes of God's
audible voice."D This is why he anachronistically claims that the
"magisterial Reformers (especially Calvin)," the Puritans, Jonathan
Edwards, etc., also held to his own neo-Barthian emphasis on the
"qualitative transcendence of divine truth over the earthen
vessels."14 To defend his position that the Word of God "does not
consist in revealed truths that are objectively 'there' in the Bible," he
must simultaneously agree and disagree with Carl Henry, saying
that:
God reveals himself not only in acts but also in words. But does
God reveal words and statements, and, if so, are they identical with
the biblical words? Is there not a qualitative distance between the
speech of God and the writing of humans?'5
But why must there be and how can there be this "qualitative
distance" between God's Word and some transcendent "divine
12Ibid., 56-7. Herein Bloesch is much indebted to Soren Kierkegaard and his
concept of "contemporaneousness" as developed to relate Christ the Word to later
believers in Philosophical Fragments. It is in regard to this very concern that this writer
recently discovered a pertinent point made by Millard Erickson about Bloesh's view
of Scripture, nne with which he is essentially in agreement. He says that "Bloesch
chooses to identify with the "sacramental" approach [to understanding the nature of
Scripture] .... this is not to say that the words of Scripture are directly revealed (as in
the Scholastic approach) but that SCrIpture embodies the truth that God wants us to
hear." "It is the Word of God in human clothing, the revelation of God transmitted
through human concepts and imagery." Erickson adds that, "It appears that we have
here a view of revelation and the Bible that is basically the orthodox view, but
influenced by elements of Barth's view."
13Ibid., 58.
14Ibid., 60.
15Ibid., 67.
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speech/words" (whatever that might be, as an abstraction) and
human language unless there is an inherent limitation to the gracious
condescension of God and his desire to make himself redemptively
and objectively known as he is for us in history?
It must be acknowledged that the phrase "Word of God" is used
with contextual variety in Scripture. Scripture is not "Word of God"
in the same sense, or better, as I will argue, at the same "level" as
Christ the Word, for he is by nature the eternal, self-disclosure of
God (John 1). And yes, Scripture is the God-given witness to Christ
(John 5:39). Scripture, by the process of theopneustos, in, of, from, and
under Christ, is derivatively Word of God. But by God's grace, it is
Word of God, a conclusion affirmed by scriptural usage of the
concept "Word of God." It is here that Bloesch, like Barth and
Brunner in various ways, falls into disjunctive or dichotomous
(dualist) means of conceptualizing the Word of God out of a neoPlatonic fear that an affirmation of such a historical, linguistic Word
of God would tarnish the Word of God. What then of the
incarna tion ?16
This "transcendentalizing" tendency causes Bloesch (like Barth)
to back away from such condescension and from all truly
asymmetrical, interactive, unitary God-world-human (historical)
redemptive relatedness. While chiding Barth for his revelational
"Nestorianism," Bloesch is, from one perspective, almost as
"Nestorian" as Barth at this point. But from another side, Bloesch,
with his desire to lift up the divine authority of the, finally, human
word of Scripture, is probably best characterized as "Arian"
regarding the relation of Scripture to the Word of God.

B. Gabriel Fackre
For many years, Gabriel Fackre, too, has labored for what he has
called a properly "evangelical" theology within the mainline streams
of Reformed thought in the United Church of Christ, AndoverNewton Theological School (where he is Abbot Professor of
Theology), and the Boston Consortium of theological schools. His
writings have influenced recent thought on worship, evangelical
ecumenism, and especially the contemporary effects of the Noachic
covenant and narrative theology. The last two especially play crucial
roles within the argument in his new work, The Doctrine of Revelation:

A Narrative Interpretation.
Much of Fackre's reformulation of the doctrine of revelation
stands under the broad influence of Avery Dulles's Models of
Revelation, especially Dulles's emphasis on the centrality of
revelation. As Dulles puts it, "The great theological disputes turn
out, upon reflection, to rest on different understandings of
16This is a concern and relation which Bloesch comes very close to
acknowledging on pp.69-70.
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revelation, often simply taken for granted."!7 Also crucial for Fackre
are Dulles's primary "models," "intellectual constructs that express
major tendencies"-here, of course, with reference to revelation.
Fackre draws on Dulles's five phenomenological models of
revelation and transposes them into his four "phases of revelation,"
which he sets in terms of his narrative approach and then
exemplifies in terms of prominent twentieth-century Christian
theological expressions of revelation. In terms of narrative, or the
central" disclosive moments" within "the comprehensive story of
reconciliation," Fackre's reconfiguration emphasizes first
"preservation" or revelation vis-a-vis universal human experience;
second, "action" or revelation in definitive acts of God, especially the
election of Israel and then centrally the Incarnation; third, and quite
significantly, "inspiration" or the "privileged" accounts and
interpretations of the deeds of God in Scripture (a position Dulles
terms "revelation as Doctrine"); and fourth, "illumination," or the
light God sheds on all previous acts of divine disclosure. Within
twentieth-century discussions of revelation, Fackre examines a series
of "interlocutors" who typify these particular aspects of the "Grand
Narrative" of revelation-especially Paul Tillich ("preservation"),
Karl Barth ("incarnate action"), Carl Henry ("inspiration"), and Karl
Rahner ("ecclesial illumination"). Fackre's evangelical concern is that
these models be holistically and properly seen within the broad
purposes of God's reconciling divine disclosure. But in the course of
discussion it becomes clear also that Fackre is committed to
essentially the Barthian-Christocentric position, not only as it rightly
grounds all revelation in Jesus Christ, but also as it finally cuts off
"inspired" Scripture from any direct participation in and as "Word of
God" in the strict sense. The relation of the chapters on "incarnate
action" and "inspiration" are then crucial in presenting Fackre's
narrative case at this particular point of concern.
All this is not to say that Fackre denies cognitive revelation in
order to reduce the heart of what may be called divine revelation to
the content-less "encounter" of "dialectical presence" (e.g., so-called
neo-orthodoxy). In criticizing Tillich's "ontological reason" and
religious symbols as revelation, Fackre reveals this concern, saying
that
While the symbols of myth and cult are said to give "knowledge"
of ultimate reality, the word in that context means access to mystery
of being itself. Their purpose is expressive and evocative, not
cognitive in its usual meaning.!R

And, in criticizing Barth's epistemology, Fackre somewhat obscurely
points in this direction when he states that
17Avery Dulles, Models of Revelation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1992) xix.
1BGabrie\ Fackre, The Doctrine of Revelation: A Narrative Interpretation (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997) 85.
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The problems with Barth's epistemology arise when he departs
from his own biblical standard for understanding the freedom of
God for and among us. This might be described as the influence of
an "actualism" with philosophical roots in existentialist
philosophy .... The entrance of [divine sovereignty and the internal
testimony of the Holy Spirit] into the doctrine of revelation is
related to Barth's determination to protect the decisiveness of the
["incarnate action"] chapter of the Story. Only here in Jesus Christ
is God free for us .... [T]he actual address happens only when and
where He wills it to be so .... [Thus] no assurance can be given that
the media [e.g., Bible] are always and everywhere bearers of the
knowledge of GOd. 19

Yet here, too, as in the Tillich critique, the real nature of
"knowledge of God" and "cognitive" revelation is not clear. Given
what we will see of Fackre's concerns about "propositional"
(content-ful) revelation, and so of any identification of Scripture with
divine Word of God in more than an indirect sense, one is left with
as much doubt about Fackre as Fackre had about Tillich. 20
While critical of Barth at points and bringing proper initial
corrective to the particular form of Barth's Christocentric concept of
revelation, Fackre often falls in step with that very same type of
Christocentricity as the core of his own understanding of the "Grand
Narrative." For Fackre, "All that is said in this [Fackre's] work on
revelation is finally traceable to the Word that God spoke to us in the
historical event of Jesus Christ.''21 This means that Christ is rightly
regarded as the defining action of God, God's ultimate deed and
disclosure, and the "central chapter of the story" which then
determines what we see in all other aspects of the story. But it also
means that Jesus Christ is finally the one, true, and only Word of
God. While emphasizing, much like the later Barth, the freedom of
God in promising a trustworthy Presence in all of his reconciling
work (and so the narrative), Fackre also insists that Christ is "the one
Word" and Scripture, as "witness to that Word," stands at last
outside of what can be truly regarded as divine disclosure or Word
of God. So Fackre's own Christocentricity, no less than Barth's.
reflects a fear that any historical claim to continuity (identity) with
the revelatory divine Presence, other than the incarnate Word.
imperils that centrality of Christ.22 Fackre expresses a significan t
point for his larger and narrower purposes when he asks,
19Ibid .. 137f.
20In relation to such emphases one ought to note what Fackre is affirming \'1.1
Donald Bailie (Fackre, The Doctrine. 31-2).
21Thid .. 147.
22It is noteworthy that in reference to Scripture, Fackre acknowledges Barth,
correctness in teaching a generation to be wary of theologies that "take deity capture
in forms of human manufacture." The point is that, like Barth, Fackre understandGod's sovereignty, and thus God's freedom, to mean that the one place that God ha,
chosen to be revelatorily free for us and among us is in Jesus Christ. Thus it is to thi,
one place that Scripture bears witness (Fackre. The Doctrine, 137f.).
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In what authority do we say that Jesus Christ is the centre of the
narrative of ... revelation? In the thought of Karl Barth, and
throughout this work, we have turned to the "Bible" definitively
and the "Church" derivatively as witness to the Word come among
US. 23

But why is this so? Why are Scripture and tradition, Bible and
church, said to be "definitively" and "derivatively" related to the
revelation and so to authority? Our concern again is Scripture, and
Fackre's point is directed to inspiration of Scripture and to dialogue
with the work of Carl Henry. Here Fackre clearly confirms his
chastened Barthian understanding of Scripture and Word.
Fackre's concern with what he calls "the much-neglected theme
of the inspiration of Scripture," occurs via analysis of Carl Henry's
work, as he seeks to uncover why the Bible is an authoritative source
of the narrative, "a phase of revelation."24 Such references to
"authority" and "revelation" would appear to mean prima facie that
Scripture is itself revelation. Not so. Fackre emphasizes the crucial
nature of the "inspiration" of the text of Scripture and formulates his
view in dialogical contrast to historical evangelicalism's assertion of
a divinely content-ful (i.e., propositional) text of Scripture as an
aspect and product of revelation in and under Christ by the Spirit.
Wanting to correct this in a "properly evangelical" way, Fackre
analyzes Henry's position along lines that are useful and often
insightful as well as formative for his own disjunctive, dualist
understanding of Word-Scripture.
Carl Henry's role has been to call theologians back to
"inspiration" and so to the importance of the text and the place of
words in the inspiration of Scripture. The acts of God are vacuous
without verbal interpretation. Fackre acknowledges that Henry's
view of verbal inspiration arises from a legitimate concern for the
place of propositions in the inspiration of Scripture. Put in narrative
terms, Fackre asks whether biblical images and Scripture's
"overarching story" correspond to actual human and divine states of
affaIrS. And does Scripture make cognitive truth-claims along these
lines? Henry insists that revelation cannot be reduced to the personal
or social power of Encounter, metaphor, or community story. While
Scripture, understood as a participative aspect of revelation, does
23Ibid.
24He responds to Carl Henry's contributions to the "narrative of revelation" in
terms of the "inspiration" of the text of Scripture. Fackre says that" As all loyalties are
rooted in a 'leap of faith,' so the doctrine of inspiration presupposes a primal decision:
the Yes to the living Word by the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit. The believer
brought to Jesus Christ by that Word spoken and received through the power of the
Spirit is led into the Great Narrative found only in this Book. To be drawn to Christ is
to be drawn into the Story, into its 'source' text. ... The authenticity of the encounter
with the Word, Jesus Christ, is inseparable, therefore, from the trustworthiness of
Scripture." Such points reflect somewhat how Fackre juxtaposes Word Christ and
Scripture text, but also leave a question as to how and why Carl Henry was used at
all-except to broach the topic or category of "inspiration" (Fackre, The Doctrine, 162).
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meet us personally and on the affective level, and does constitute the
unique language world of the Christian community, yet "its
meaning is not exhausted by its evocative and expressive power."
Paraphrasing what he takes to be one of Henry's central
contributions, in terms of the "symbolic truth" of language
philosophy, Fackre says that
Biblical symbol ... depicts Reality as well as drawing us into
relationship with it. It discloses states of affairs, the way things are
with both God and the world. However expressed ... fundamental
assertions about realitr-propositions-are made that invite the
response of Yes or No.2

Well and good as far as it goes.
Yet it is at this very juncture, where actual content-ful disclosure
draws nigh to Scripture text, that Fackre calls John Baillie and Karl
Barth to his constructive aid lest any possible conceptual divine
content be related too closely to a historical text. Using Baillie's
parallel critique of Austin Farrer, he says
John Baillie is right in his concern that Farrer's images not be too
simply juxtaposed to propositions for "images and propositional
truths are inextricably intermingled." On the other hand, Karl Barth
is right in contrasting the speaking of the Word in the person of
Jesus Christ [i.e., incarnation] as "Dells dixit" with the" Palilus dixit"
of the biblical words, thereby challenging theories of inspiration
which identify one with the other. 26

But while influenced by Barth's dichotomy, Fackre finds legitimacy
in Henry's defense of "propositional content," thus narrowing the
chasm and allowing some connection between Deus dixit and Paulus
dixit. Again, this means simply a chastened, and so "narrowed,"
Barthian disjunction between Word and text. While affirming a
content-ful revelation, Fackre, then, like Bloesch, retranscendentalizes such content, a la Barth and then eschatologizes
it, a la Jiirgen Moltmann.
The evangelical experience tempts closure of the distance between
the Now and the Not Yet. ... [Epistemologically it is] to overlook
the mirror dimmed and the glass darkened. Scripture is held [by
Carl Henry] to shine now with a light reserved only for a day yet to
be .... The eschatological nature of verbal inspiration appears in
Henry's construal of biblical propositions .... His understanding of
25Ibid., 167-8. Fackre can speak of "propositional truths," e.g., God created the'
world, Israel is called into special covenant, God comes among us in Jesus Christ to
reconcile the world. But he speaks of these as "truths of the symbol" and as
"embedded in" each chapter of the Grand narrative. Thus, he significantly states as d
definition of "proposition," "that which is expressed in a statement as opposed to the
way it is expressed." Cf. Fackre's illuminating endnote 35 (pp. 176-7) to which one could
wish that Fackre paid more careful attention.
26Ibid., 168.
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[the propositions] as sentences ... affiliates the human words
themselves with the clarity of Light reserved alone for the EndY

Thus, applying eschatologically, revelatorily, and so
epistemologically Luther's simul justus et peccator to Scripture and to
Henry-type evangelical views of Scripture, Fackre emphasizes the
problem of too closely tying Word of God to Scripture and failing to
honor the temporal distinction between eschatologically ultimate
revelation and the penultimate media, Scripture. Any collapse of
eschatological truth into the verbal, or the incarnate Word (the
Centre) into the historical, epistemic text, is said to miss Barth's point
in the Barmen Confession: the "one Word of God" is not replicated by,
but "attested by," Holy Scripture.28
But, again, the problem is that Fackre's dualist or disjunctive
thinking leads him to conclude that only clear differentiations will
suffice to set forth properly the "Centre" of the "Grand Narrative" of
revelation, Jesus Christ, the Word of God. But this is not a necessary
or even a useful principle-certainly not with regard to the
Scripture-Word of God relationship. A statement Fackre makes near
the end of his discussion of "Scripture: Inspiration" is revealing:
"Inspiration, while part of the revelation story, is neither the whole
nor the heart of it, and must find its derivative place under the Word
enfleshed and its relative place before the Word eschatological. "29 That
is correct. Properly understood, this is a position with which Carl
Henry would agree. But the nature of "inspiration" (the force of
which Fackre seeks to blunt) of the historical text of Scripture is not
intended to displace the centrality of Jesus Christ, the ontological
Word made flesh, in the whole of God's redemptive self-disclosure.
Scripture is the inspired witness to Christ; it is such by the Spirit
under Christ the Word. But this subordinate servant's role is clear in
Scripture itself and is affirmed historically by the church. Scripture
is, to use Fackre's own term, "derivative" Word of God, unitarily
(and economically) grounded in Christ the Word. Borrowing from
Einstein's portrayals of reality (mutatis mutandis), Christ the higher
"level" of divine disclosure is the interactively related basis of the
lower, historical, written "level," of revelation, by the Spirit of God.
This is a position taken in Scripture when Scripture itself is referred
to.
Therefore Fackre affirms Scripture as a "part" of revelation, as
the "in-Spirited" media integral to "the Tale" by which Christ and
(non-textual and, apparently non-historical) content related to Christ
(whatever that might be) corne to us. He reflects a desire to affirm an
authoritative Scripture text that can in some sense be called" divine"
as well as human, a result of the action of the Spirit. Yet it is a text
which cannot be directly continuous, even at a lower level, to Christ
27Ibid., 170.
28Ibid., 172.
2"Ibid., 175.
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the Word of God. His affirmation that God speaks "words," but
words that are necessarily non-linguistic and non-historical, reflects
again the effects of platonic perspectives. As with Bloesch, using the
early Christological positions analogously, we find an "Arian"
position on Scripture, a position resulting, like Arius's own, from an
inherent dualism.

C. CLARK PINNOCK
For some years, Clark Pinnock has been professor of theology at
McMaster Divinity School and continues to be engaged in issues of
concern to evangelicals and non-evangelicals alike. Scripture and
biblical authority are among the issues with which he is often
identified. His thinking in Biblical Revelation (1971) developed
eventually to his notable work The Scripture Principle (1984), with
which we will now interact.
While this is the oldest of the three works examined here, it is in
many respects the best. Pinnock grapples with issues in ways which
others, perhaps concerned that they might not be understood, would
avoid. The problem of course is that his book reflects his thinking
over fifteen years ago; and surely his views on a number of these
issues have changed. But a clear statement of his current
understanding of the nature of Scripture would be difficult to obtain
from his recent more polemical writings.
Pinnock means by "The Scripture Principle" first, that there is a
place where the Word of God is accessible in human form. The
creaturely text of Scripture is God's written Word and the place
where he reveals his mind, where God has communicated
authoritatively on subjects which call for submission. Thus Scripture
is an informative Word of God to the church, given as divinely
authoritative and in contentfullanguage.3o Second, Pinnock speaks
in defense of scriptural authority and trustworthiness in the face of
the contemporary crisis regarding "the Scripture Principle." Third,
he wants "classical Christians," who maintain scriptural authority, to
"move ahead" in their understanding against the current crisis, at
the heart of which is the "liberal denial" of the ancient, ecumenical,
classical conviction that Scripture is the written, authoritative Word
of God. This crisis has arisen from the cultural shift to secular and
rationalist modernity, and hence to an antipathy to any book
speaking of God and humanity in pre-modern categories and to an
orthodoxy which rigidly locks God in a book. 31
Like Bloesch and Fackre, Pinnock rightly emphasizes the
Christocentric pattern and soteric purpose of all self-disclosure of God.
Yet, contra Barth, and more clearly than Bloesch or Fackre, Pinnock
is adamant that the biblical presentation of "revelation" is "not a
30Clark H. Pinnock, The Scripture Principle (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1984)
62, d. Pr' xiii.
3 Ibid., vii, xiii, xiv.
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single activity or a simple entity but that the 'pattern of revelation'
within which Scripture fits is a complex web and set of actions
designed to complementarily disclose the divine message of
salvation" ("many and various ways God spoke"). Revelation is
multifaceted and "bipolar" in structure, both objective and
subjective, content revealed, received, and confirmed. 32 But "Jesus
Christ is and must be the centerpiece of the Christian revelation,
because in him God entered the parameters of a human life ... the
revelation of God without peer. Of all the forms of revelation, this is
the best."33 Thus Scripture exists to bear witness of him (John 5:39).
The Christ principle of incarnation is at the core of all consideration
of the richly variegated pattern of divine revelation.
In this way, Pinnock corrects not only Barth but most theological
streams since Schleiermacher by stressing the "content," the
"objective truths of revelation"-it is no mere existential address or
content-less encounter. In this he advances beyond the similar
correctives of modem views as found in Bloesch and Fackre, and
stands against these tendencies which refuse to affirm
a message full of content and truth given in intelligible speech and
language-as if there were some kind of opposition between
personal revelation and verbal communication. The New
Testament knows no such dichotomy; it stems from modern
philosophical objections to cognitive revelation and an objective
knowledge of God. 34

This is right to the point. Pinnock's analysis and criticism of the
modem shift from objective, contentful revelation is exacting and
correct. Whether in the context of Israel's covenantal anticipation or
the new covenant fulfillment in Jesus Christ, the incarnate Word,
revelation according to Scripture itself is content-ful, intelligible, and
speaks to persons on subjects they are able to understand.35
32Ibid., 4, 5, 8.
33Ibid., 10.
34Ibid., 14.
35Ibid. Note that Pinnock's early, excellent corrective factors lead to the dualist
disjunctive tendency to negate content-ful revelation. At this point he contends that,
"One could explain the dramatic shift away from content by listing a series of factors
that incline modern minds to resistance: the theistic model presupposed by taking the
Bible as written revelation, the miracles accompanying the story of divine redemption,
Kant's dogma that one can have no knowledge of the transcendent such as the Bible
claims, to deny numerous objections to one or another of the biblical concepts, the
belief in the fallibility of the Bible as propounded by liberal criticism, and the
imperialism of any claim that makes Jesus the only reason for the rejection of content
in revelation: a lot of moderns are not willing to have dictated to them how they must
think and how they must act. The idea that human beings must approach God on his
terms, implied by the second commandment, not in ways they themselves define, is
simply unacceptable to the autonomous people of today. We face such a resistance to
what the Bible teaches today that the battle necessarily takes place around the issue of
revelation and inspiration." Then, getting even more to the core of the problem and its
implications, he says, "By shifting away from the objective content of revelation
liberal theology has given the church a migraine headache. The truth foundations of
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Does this affirmation truly give place to the text of Scripture in
Pinnock's "pattern of revelation" in such a way that at some level
Scripture is ontologically Word of God? It appears so. Two points
seem constructively significant here, particularly in contrast to
Fackre. First, in a note, Pinnock points out that Klaas Runia has
rightly criticized and corrected Barth's exclusion of the scriptural text
from the revelation it attests. 36 Second, he clearly distinguishes
"revelation" from the church tradition that it engenders.37 While
occasionally referring to Scripture as a "medium" or "vehicle" of
revelation, Pinnock's early argumentation almost always relates
"Scripture" and "Word of God/revelation" in a way fully in keeping
with the historical position of the church, i.e., "Scripture is the
written Word of God" or "written revelation of God." Referring to
the typical OT portrayals, Pinnock points out that
In the prophets ... people who see themselves, in the tradition of
Moses, able to mediate God's Word to the people ... [they] spoke
out boldly the words he gave them. They were servants to whom
the Lord had revealed his secrets (Amos 3:7). They believed that
God had put his words in their mouths .... They spoke the very
word of God to Israel. 38

Pinnock finds the NT to be no different, especially as it both
endorses and quotes from the OT "as the Word of God,"39 and then
claims for itself the same status. 40 While he periodically expresses an
occasionalistic view of Scripture as Word of God, i.e., that part of
Scripture might have been Word but is no longer Word of God for us
(probably referring to applicability),41 he does not press this idea.
Essentially his position early in The Scripture Principle is that
Scripture objectively presents us, informationally or content-fully,
with the "plans and purposes of God." While pointing out that
Scripture is unsystematic and fragmentary, Pinnock seems clear that
its testimony suggests that it was God's will that "written revelation
in the form of Scripture" should come forth out of the tradition of
Israel and church to "preserve the substance of the faith for
posterity." At this point, then, Pinnock affirms that "Holy Scripture
the gospel are swept away and the validity of the gospel cast in doubt. We face <l
dilemma not unlike the one Luther faced: is the gospel and salvation based upon the
Word and work of God, or is it founded upon human wisdom and achievement? Is
Christian theology a clear rendition of the Word of God given in the Scriptures, or is it
the highest and best human option? Emphasizing the objective side of revelation and
the authority of the Bible has nothing to do with bibliolatry or rationalism. It has to do
with keeping the church securely founded upon the apostolic scriptural witness,
which is essential to its life and work" (Pinnock, The Scripture Principle, 24, 27).
36Klaas Runia, Karl Barth's Doctrine of Holy Scripture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1962) 230 n. 34.
37Ibid., 15.
38Ibid., 32.
39Ibid., 39-40.
4oIbid., 44-54. Cf. esp. pp. 43, 46, 54.
41E.g., ibid., 41.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

MORRISON: SCRIPTURE AS WORD OF GOD

179

is the inspired Word of God," a divine gift as "classical Christians"
have always believed. 42
But the idea of Scripture as "medium," "vehicle," or "conveyor"
of the revelation of God (revelation then being different, other, or
beyond the text, having only formal and functional connection to the
text), occasionally present early on, becomes increasingly dominant
and finally determinant. This point is sometimes made, initially, in
the "practical" sense whereby knowledge of the Scripture text as
such apart from faith is not knowledge of the Word of God, since it
lacks "the eyes of faith" -seemingly reflecting a sense most would
agree withP But the intent of the argument is more transitional to a
"sacramental" role for Scripture akin to Fackre's. All agree that
Scripture presents its truths in human language, and most hold some
form of accommodation. But does the humanity of the text require
disjunction from the self-disclosure of God in terms of any and all
identity? Or can such human language be both witness and
conveyer, a direct product of revelation, inscripturated Word of God
by the Spirit? By using a number of metaphors, the most noteworthy
being John Calvin's picture of "eyeglasses" and a "freight train,"
Pinnock builds his point that as the glasses help one to see reality
"out there" and as the train carries freight that is not itself the train,
Scripture, too, is the divinely given medium through which the
transcendent Word of God comes from beyond.
Yet here it must be noted that for Pinnock, in contrast to Bloesch
and Fackre, the interactive relation and inseparability of Word-text
remain very strong. This seems to result from the conceptual
implications of his acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the
Incarnation analogy for our understanding of Scripture.
Christian theology . . . [presupposing God] is not beyond its
epistemic rights in claiming that God has reliably revealed himself
and his will in a set of creaturely modalities .... So long as the God
of the gospel is believed in, the Bible itself is no conundrum. It can
be God's infallible Word in exactly the way that it claims to be his
Word and the product of God's revelational activity. If Jesus Christ

42Ibid., 54. Note also pp. 55-7, 62. On p. 62, Pinnock explains what a (not "the")
Scripture principle means. "It means that there is a locus of the Word of God in a
humanly accessible form available to us. It means that the Bible is regarded as a
creaturely text that is at the same time God's own written Word, and that we can
consult his Word, which reveals his mind, and seek to know his will in it. It means
that God has communicated authoritatively to us on those subjects about which
Scripture teaches, whether doctrinal, ethical, or scriptural, and that we believers
willingly subject ourselves to this rule of faith. More than merely human tradition and
merely existential address, the Bible is the informative Word of God to the church.
The text is not reduced to an expression of human experience and tradition as in
liberalism, but is a contentful language deposit that addresses, as it decides, with the
authority of God."
43Ibid., 56.
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was raised from the dead ... then the process of revelation and its
products that center upon Christ are vindicated along with him.44

Yet despite such apparent affirmation, Pinnock's final
disjunction of Scripture text and Word becomes quite plain.
Affirming again that God ultimately gave Scripture to be that
"literary vehicle of his Word," he further concludes that "Barth was
right to speak about a distance between the Word of God and the
text of the Bible." While the written medium is very limited, these
restrictions are overcome by the divine message given through it. 45
Pinnock, then, takes a relatively strong view of the inspiration of
Holy Scripture, affirming the dynamic work of the Spirit, who
interfaces with culture-bound and limited human beings. So he
considers it a divine product, a divine and human writing, and as
such a functional "Word of God," almost the sine qua non of our
"hearing of the Word of God" that is conveyed through the text for
us to hear and heed. In this way, Pinnock recognizes the divine
nature of the text of Scripture, but a text brought into existence to
mediate the transcendent Word of God in Christ. Thus Scripture is,
for Pinnock, not really so much a product of revelation as it is a
product for revelation. It is the "switch track" by which the
transcendent Word can be mediated redemptively into the
space-time domain of human life. This disjunctive, "sacramental"
conception of the relation of Scripture text to Word of God, reflected
less adequately in Bloesch and Fackre, is similar to the view of Barth
and also to Tillich's use of revelatory symbols. And the need for such
sharp differentiation arises again out of the dualist impulse and thus
from the unwillingness to conceive of unitary, interactive
"levels"-in this case "levels" of the one Word of God, whether
ontological or derivative. There is no need to divide Scripture from
the Word of God by reducing the former to a "functional" Word,
contrary to scriptural usage. Rather, true scriptural differentiation
within relational singularity allows one to reflect all aspects of the
Word of God in their proper relations to one another within the
unitary whole and under Christ.
My concern in the analyses of Bloesch, Fackre, and Pinnock has
not been to ascertain any movement into heterodoxy. All three seem
to stand within the broad parameters of orthodoxy, and, when "push
44Ibid., 95. Note also pp. 96-7ff. Here Pinnock further negates earlier statements
affirming that Scripture is Word of God, the outcome reflecting something of an
"adoptionism" in some contexts and" Arianism" in other contexts with regard to the
status of Scripture and its relation to the Word of God.
45Ibid., 100-1, where Pinnock approves of Hans Kung's understanding of
Scripture, i.e., that "Through all human fragility and the whole historical relativity and
rotation of the biblical authors, who are often able to speak only stammeringly and
with inadequate conceptual means, it happens that God's call as it finally sounded out
in Jesus is truthfully heard, believed and realized." It is also here that Pinnock begins
to voice his quarrel with Calvinist orthodoxy and what he sees to be the problematic
effects of its deterministic views on the modem formulations of biblical inerrancy, etc
Cf. pp. 188, 191.
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comes to shove," Pinnock especially stands very close to the
historical orthodox position. But my concerns are, first, the entrance
and disjunctive effects of ontological and epistemological dualism
into the doctrine of revelation, which may, if pressed consistently,
lead to adoptionism or to an Arian Christology; and, second, the
resulting dichotomous severing of the historical text of Scripture
from revelation-as-such, Word of God, thus reducing any relation to
the merely functional.
II. REFORMULA nON AND REAFFIRMA nON OF HOL Y
SCRIPTURE AS WORD OF GOD

A. Written Language-Word of God?

J.

I. Packer

Is a severance of Scripture from the Word of God (in terms of
actual ontological and historical participation and
economic/"leveled" identity) a needed corrective to the historical
position of the church? In other words, reckoning the
presuppositions involved, ought we finally to recognize the idealhistorical differences inherent in the issue and so forgo any
linkage/continuity that might somehow jeopardize that
transcendentalized, ideal Word? Must the Kantian noumenalphenomenal split and the consequent positivistic skepticism about
any real referentiality of human language be taken to heart and
accepted by contemporary Christian orthodoxy? Or should such
(neo-) platonic, dualistic incursions be resisted and the reaffirmation
of the revelatory nature of the divine-human text of Scripture, as
derivative Word of God (by the Holy Spirit), be given and restated?
It is this second option which the argument here will now briefly
pursue.
Can human linguistic forms, human language, and specifically
written human language ever be legitimately reckoned as Word of
God, indeed, God's own verbal expression? Can God give objective,
content-ful, as well as personal, disclosure of himself and his
purposes in space-time? Historically, the answer has been "yes." The
writers of Scripture themselves believed that Yahweh, the covenant
God, the God self-revealed in Jesus of Nazareth, is the speaking God
who declares himself and his ways to his prophets, who thus makes
himself known personally and informationally to his people. OT
prophets, Jesus, and the apostles were of one mind on this,
regardless of contemporary views about such communicability
within the God-world-human relation. Phrases such as "Thus says
Yahweh" and "God/Holy Spirit spoke through the prophets"46
permeate both Testaments and are clearly to be taken as in some
sense literally true. If Jesus is recognized as God incarnate, then his
4hE.g., Acts 28:25; Heb 1: 1, 3, 7; etc.
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speaking, teaching, and witness to the Father, as the Father's own
Word, further confirms God's content-ful use of human language
(any disjunctive difference between spoken disclosure and written
communication is evasive, obscurantist non-sense). The early church
reaffirmed this categorically in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan
Creed, echoing the scriptural language, "The Holy Spirit ... who
spoke through the prophets."
J. I. Packer finds that the modern theological aberration that
rejects the possibility of God declaring himself to humanity
objectively, content-fully (informative, factual), and in human
linguistic forms, has multiple roots, two of which are especially
pertinent to the formulations of Bloesch, Fackre, and, to a lesser
extent, Pinnock. First, pervasively skeptical Western culture has
accepted the unproven assumption that all language is inadequate as
a means of personal communication. If such inadequacy occurs at
the common human level, the problem is surely much greater at the
divine-human levelY Second, modern doubt regarding the
possibility of content-ful divine communication has been influenced
by so-called "Eastern" religious notions, as well as parallel emphases
in resurgent neo-platonism, both of which stress the ineffability and
inexpressibility of the remote or undifferentiated "divine."48 Third,
and more directly applicable, Packer rightly points out the
prominent contemporary doubt that human language can
communicate transcendent realities at all.49 Semantics and linguistic
analysis, long under the dualistic sway of defunct logical positivism,
have arbitrarily concluded that language cannot connote, denote,
inform, or point legitimately beyond the world of the senses. Finally,
skepticism about the possibility of God's expressing himself in
human linguistic forms arises from the modern widespread
unwillingness of theologians to allow that in Scripture, God is
actually informing human beings about himself.so Whatever may be
acknowledged about Scripture somehow "mediating" contact with
God/the divine (why Scripture?), even so, many are yet more certain
that Holy Scripture is not God's Word in any way resembling
Augustine's "what thy Scripture says, thou dost say." As alluded to
previously, Immanuel Kant's rather deistic epistemological dualism
led him to deny both the need and the very possibility of verbal
revelation from God. Theological liberalism, from Schleiermacher
and Ritschl to the present, has remained faithful to Kant, despIte
variations in emphasis. Yet it has been the breakaway movement of
"dialectical theology" (or "neo-orthodoxy") which has been so
directly influential on contemporary evangelical thought at this
point, and it too has maintained Kant's noumenal-phenomenal split
47James 1. Packer, "The Adequacy of Human Language," in Inerrancy (ed
Norman L. Geisler; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1980) 202.
48Ibid., 205-6.
49Ibid., 203-4.
sOIbid., 204-5.
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and the consequent rejection of Scripture as Word of God (except in
an occasionalist and functional way).
Within contemporary evangelical discussion on the nature of
Scripture, Bloesch, Fackre, and Pinnock embrace the third form of
skepticism, the inability of language adequately to refer to the
"transcendent." More explicit is a Kantian dualism, which, when
combined
with
Buberian "personalism," ends in
"transcendentalizing" and de-historicizing both God and his Word,
while declaring that very Word to be personal rather than
propositional. Kant's deistic agnosticism left God both remote and
unintelligible, and then Barth, even the mature Barth, concluded, as
Frame, rightly points out, that
God's transcendence [so understood] implies that he cannot be
clearly revealed to men, clearly represented by human words and
concepts. . . . [But] Scripture never deduces from God's
transcendence the inadequacy and fallibility (let alone the
impossibility) of all verbal revelation. Quite the contrary .... Verbal
revelation is to be obeyed without question because of the divine
transcendence. 51

Barthian unwillingness to allow for any real, "substantial"
continuity, connection, identity, or ontological participation of the
content-ful (propositional) scriptural wording as being properly
within the larger category "Word of God" arises directly from
Kantian, dualistic, transcendentalist thinking, as is evident especially
in Bloesch and Fackre. There is no need first to extol Scripture's
mediated glory and then to conclude that Scripture is finally the
word of man rather than the Word of God, except in some
sacramental sense. Such simultaneous bibliological ArianismAdoptionism is only necessitated by these dualist presuppositions.
This is not to say that Bloesch's, Fackre's, and Pinnock's concerns
with the real identity of Scnpture and Word of God are insubstantial,
in light of issues arising from elements of the text relating to human
culture-perspectives and elements bound to a particular history
and place. Nor are the linguistic-analytical questions empty, as they
give critical attention to the very human semantic forms of discourse
such as analogy, parable, model, etc. Rather, the point is that such
concerns are answered in the God-world-human interactive
relatedness, established in creation, sustained in providence, and
completed redemptively in the life, death, and resurrection of Christ,
the Word made flesh in the power of the Holy Spirit. Calvin is right
in emphasizing that God's gracious condescension, the "humility" of
God whereby he lovingly identifies with that which is beneath him,

51John Frame, "God and Biblical Language," from God's hlerrant Word, ed. J. W.
Montgomery, quoted in Inerrancy, 215. Note the good critique of the separation of
personal from propositional in twentieth century theology (e.g., E. Brunner), in Paul
Helm's Divine Revelation: The Basic Issues (Westchester, IL: Crossway, 1982) 26-7.
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means, in terms of revelation, inspiration, and Scripture, that God
was willing to become "undignified" for human redemption. 52

B. Affimling Scripture as Word of God:
Paul Helm
British philosopher Paul Helm thoroughly discusses the question
of the relation of Scripture and Word of God in his work Divine
Revelation. Crucial to his argument is commitment to a classical
Christian affirmation: special revelation (or simply "revelation" in
the strict sense) is a cognitive concept in that it has to do with
knowledge, an actual or possible mode of knowledge of that which
cannot otherwise be known. 53 Thus, in keeping with our emphases
above, Helm too acknowledges the need for content, indeed
information ("propositional" revelation), in contrast to notions of
"personal encounter" or bare "act," etc. 54 Thus he says that
It is curious ... that while the idea that the Bible is God's special
propositional revelation has been charged with replacing God
himself by propositions about God, examination of ... periods
when such a view was dominant suggests the exact reverse ....
[There] is no antithesis between believing a proposition and
believing a person if the proposition is understood as the assertion
of a person .... So the claim that the idea of propositional special
revelation is essentially impersonal appears to rest on a
misunderstanding. 55

The modern theological claim that there is an antithesis between
"propositions" (content-ful, meaningful statements) and persons is
surely false, given that propositions are the utterance of some
person. To deny this to God, in the God-world-human relation,
reflects an arbitrary assumption of both metaphysical and
epistemological dualism.
Helm's primary dialogue partner is Karl Barth, and then those
variously influenced by Barth's primary reasons for denying that
Scripture can be the Word of God. Barth's understanding of
revelation (God-in-Christ as independent of the knower) is both
ontologically objective and epistemologically subjective with respect
to revelation (human knowledge of God). What are the results? Put
briefly, Barth contends that God is sovereignly free in his revelation
Revelation cannot be "static." Yet the very notion of covenant and
covenant faithfulness shows that God is willing to limit himself.
Second, and consequently, Barth says that any revelation of tht'
sovereignly free God must be a personal act or event. But given the
52Cf. Calvin, Instituies 1.8.1; also Calvin's comments on 1 John 3:12 in hI'
commentary.
53Helm, Viville RCl'eiatioll, 32ff.
541bid, chap. 2.
55Ibid,26-7.
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biblical pattern, special revelation cannot be bare act or event of God,
but acts or events of God and interpretation. Third, modernity as a
whole and "Barthian" formulations of revelation in particular have
been hesitant to allow for divine self-disclosure as truly historical, a
datum of history. In terms of Word and Scripture, Barth points out
that Scripture is a "worldly (historical) document" and so this rules
out a priori any possibility of the Bible being itself and as such God's
Word. Yet, says Helm, Barth's act/event formulation of revelation,
as related to (yet different from) Scripture as "witness" to revelation,
means that the "words" of the text are altered in the moment they
became Word for an individual. In fact, most texts of Scripture are
not plausible as candidates for such an occasionalism of the Word.
Also, Barth's emphasis on scriptural witness becoming Word of God
"for me" leads to the "private language" problem and essential
incommunicability. 56 But of special importance is Helm's analysis of
the influential Barthian contention that Holy Scripture is only the
"witness" to the Word of God, an analysis which, in effect, turns the
Barthian contention on its head. If, as Barth presents the matter, the
relation between Scripture and God's Word is a non-contingent one
then it must be one of meaning; there must be a connection of
meaning between the two. And if there is a connection of meaning
between the two then God's Word must be propositional, since the
Bible is propositional and there is a logical relationship between the
two. But if God's Word, special revelation, is propositional, then for
Barth this must mean that it is "static" and manipulatable. Once
again, the relationship between the Bible and the Word of God, in
the Barthian scheme of things, is seen to be wholly problematic. 57

While Helm's subsequent argument about how one ought and
ought not to present a positive case for the text of Holy Scripture as
Word of God as special revelation is useful, his role here has been
primarily in terms of response to dualistic, transcendentalist
presuppositions that have been basic to modem denials of Holy
Scripture as Word of God. But before leaving this issue, the case here
can be further developed by means of a very recent work aimed at
these concerns for historical revelation.
C. Affirming "Divine Discourse" in History:
Nicholas Wolterstorff
In his recent Wilde Lectures at Oxford University, subsequently
published as Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim
that God Speaks, Nicholas Wolterstorff has sought to examine the
"strange but riveting" declaration introduced to humanity by
Judaism that "God speaks to us on our way, and that our calling as
56Ibid., 40-4.
57Ibid., 46.
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human beings is to listen to that speech from beyond and hear."se
The notion of God speaking-if true, both an unsettling and a
consoling assertion-has faced much modem hostility. But it is this
hostility which Wolterstorff addresses as "ill-advised" and "selfdefeating."
But what does Wolterstorff mean by God's "discourse" or
speaking? Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Bultmann, Tillich, and, more
recently, David Tracy and Gordon Kaufman have referred to "God's
speaking." But for these authors, the intention is at best
metaphorical, symbolic, non-informative. Barth and Brunner have
discussed "God's speaking" at great length, but for these and likeminded theologians, God's discourse or disclosure is act or
encounter without revelatory, interpretive, historical content. While
variously influenced by these modern trends, yet consciously
endeavoring to stand within Christian orthodoxy, Bloesch, Fackre,
and Pinnock are very serious about "God's speaking." They do not
want God's self-revelation reduced to merely wordless "events" or 1Thou "encounters." Yet these, too, finally balk at the radical
historicity required by any possibility of ontological connection or
identity between Scripture and Word of God. What of Wolterstorff?
Does an underlying dualistic scheme force him to transcendentalize
divine speaking to the transhistorical, beyond anything auditory or
written? Or does he attempt to correct such modem tendencies?
While Wolterstorff does not affirm the complete truthfulness of
Scripture, and while he is concerned primarily with divine
discourse/ speaking rather than with divine revelation, a fine
distinction for which he labors effectively, the question of divine
speaking as revelatory, as Word of God, is very significant to him.
Moving illustratively from the words of the child, "Tolle lege, toIle
lege," which Augustine took to be God speaking to him, he purposes
to counteract modern philosophico-theologico-epistemological
unwillingness to allow for historical, informative divine speaking,
while strongly affirming, somehow real divine revelation. The
outcome of his multi-leveled analysis of language theory is that God
need not remain incommunicative beyond bare act or meeting
("manifestational revelation") but that God can and has made
historical "assertions," "propositions" ("non-manifestational
revelation") and that this speaking can and has resulted "in a text
which, when properly interpreted, transmits knowledge from God to
US."S9

As a consciously philosophical work dealing with theological
questions, Divine Discourse develops its critical and constructive
argument without much direct reference to Scripture. But when
Wolterstorff does refer to Scripture, he emphasizes that the nearconcensus opinion among modem (post-Kantian) theologians (e.g.,

God

S8Nichoias Woiterstorff, Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) ix.
9lbid., 27-8.

S~eaks

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

MORRISON: SCRIPTURE AS WORD OF GOD

187

Barth, John Baillie, Bultmann, et a!.), that revelation can only be nonlinguistic act, stands in strong conflict to the text of Scripture itself.
Therein God is engaged in speaking or in propositional revelation
(e.g., in the Exodus).60
But for our purposes, it is most useful to note Wolterstorff's
responses to Barth and John Baillie as influential representatives of
thinking hesitant to identify the text of Scripture with Word of God.
After effectively analyzing Barth's emphatic Christocentric
understanding of "the Word of God," Jesus Christ as the one speechact of God (John 1), Wolterstorff capably points out that for all of his
emphasis on the Word of God, Barth largely avoids discussion of
God "speaking." The point is clear that apart from God's revelation
in the event of Jesus Christ there is no Word of God, no human
speaking that is truly a speaking in God's name. All acts of
"witnessing" to God's one speech-act, though under the guidance of
the Spirit, remain necessarily and only human speech. But
Wolterstorff comments,
What God does in addition [to the incarnation] is bring it about that
what God said in Jesus Christ is both presented to us and, by some
of us, acknowledged. But that "bringing about" is something
different from speaking. Barth's thought is that the very being who
is the content of Scripture and proclamation, Jesus Christ, the
Word, the speech of God, so acts on us that we acknowledge that
content. True enough. But is that action more speaking?61

While Barth (like Bloesch and Fackre) comes very close to
acknowledging this, in the final analysis he consistently avoids such
a conclusion. Why?
Wolterstorff answers by rightly noting, first, such differentiation
of Scripture from Word of God, God speaking, is now often regarded
as the only way of honoring the results of biblical criticism while
affirming Scriptural authority, the medium God uses through which
to "speak" to us. This same concern is reflected in each of our three
evangelical writers discussed above. Second, like Paul Helm,
Wolterstorff reiterates Barth's fear that assertion of God's authoring
Scripture in any direct sense compromises God's freedom.
Responding at two levels, he points out that if such authoring and
commissioning of human authors of a text is limiting then perhaps
we ought to take seriously the possibility that God is willing to limit
his freedom in this way. But beyond Helm, Wolterstorff finds that
Barth may be working with an alien concept of "freedom." He finds
it hard to see how God's decision to appropriate human speech
compromises his freedom in any way. "Probably Barth never even

6olbid., 30. Woltertorff's responses to both Karl Barth and John Baillie are quite
illuminating in clarifying his intentions and points. Cf. pp. 298-9 on John Baillie's
representative views.
61Ibid., 70, 73.
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considered the appropriation model as a way of thinking of God as
author. "62
While necessarily moving past WolterstorH's insightful, careful
argumentation, we must briefly present the bottom line of
WolterstorH's own constructive emphases on divine speaking as it
relates to our question of Scripture and Word of God. He asks why,
if Scripture were a mere medium of "revelation" in the modem sense
(event, encounter), one would continually return to Scripture's text?
Mere mediation is used but once. When its work is done, one moves
on. Wolterstorff's answer arises from his understanding of the
relation of Scripture as human discourse to divine discourse and
how Scripture can be both simultaneously. Herein he works with
four assumptions about the text. First, the books of Scripture did not
come into being by God directly producing inscriptions on
parchments but by human beings doing so. Second, those human
beings were themselves performing acts of discourse; they were not
just writing words down. Third, God's discourse is a function not
just of those human acts of inscription but "of those human acts of
discourse generated by those human acts of inscription." One must
know more than just the original text as such, but "what was being
said with those texts" by whatever human beings authorized them
as their own discourse. 63 Finally, in the fact that one person's
discourse can count as another person's discourse, Wolterstorff finds
a model for the text of Scripture. By "deputation" (e.g., the prophets)
and by "appropriation" as "supplemented" by inspiration, Christian
Scripture as a whole and its various books are to be understood as
God's discourse as well as human discourse. 64 While new questions
potentially arise from this model, it does lead Wolterstorff to
highlight authorial intention in hermeneutics in establishing the
meaning of God's discourse.

III. RE-STATEMENT: WORD OF GOD AND SCRIPTURE
Our claim is that Karl Barth's understanding of the Word of God
and the nature of Holy Scripture, as variously influential on our
three evangelical theologians, is both right and wrong-at different
levels. Barth's Christocentricity, his point that the Word of God as
such and ultimately is Jesus Christ, is correct. John 1 and Hebrews 1,
with other related texts of Scripture make clear enough that the logos
who is God and who became flesh, Jesus of Nazareth, is the selfdisclosure of God in an eternally unique, absolute, and preeminent
way. He is the ontological Word of God. But does this fact negate any
legitimacy in conceiving Scripture too as Word of God? Certainly
not. Barth is again biblical in calling Scripture the primary "witness
to the Word/Christ," for Jesus says the same in John 5:39. But, again.
62Ibid .• 74.
63Ibid., 186.
64Ibid.
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does this distinction of Christ the Word from Scripture's testimony
necessarily alleviate its continuity and nuanced identity with the
Word as Word of God? No. Indeed, the Holy Spirit, too, bears
witness to Christ. How then might these interrelated elements be
conceptually brought together or modeled in a way that is in
keeping with Scripture's own testimony to itself? Given that Jesus
Christ, incarnate, eternal Word of God, is said to be the utterly
unique, supreme, objective self-giving of God to be known; that the
scriptural data also speak of their own proper status as revelation or
Word of God; that Scripture is distinguished from Christ as
"witness" to Christ; and, finally, that God's revelation is one because
God is one, then we must avoid a flat, blank, undifferentiated
identity between Jesus Christ and Scripture as being Word of God in
the same sense. We must also avoid dualistic, disjunctive thinking
that finally separates Christ the Word and inscripturated Word, as
though the latter were actually word of man and at best only
functionally Word of God. The need is for unitary, interactive
thinking, as reflected in twentieth century physics, which can think
after the identity-in-difference inherent in our question.
For example, in Physics and Reality, Einstein accounts for
different "levels" or "strata" of knowledge in a scientific system
arising from natural cognition of ordinary experience. Scientific
theory must be brought to "logical" unity, and finally to a strict
"higher level" of logical unity, as each level of knowledge is related
to and grounded in the "higher" level. In this way, thinking
penetrates more and more toward the interior connections of reality.
Each level is "open up" to the next higher level and "disclosive"
down. No level below has its whole truth in itself, but is true as it is
interactively related to and "open up" to the greater refinement at
the next higher level. All is grounded finally beyond the contingent
in that sufficient reason for the lower contingent order of rationality
and intelligibility.65
This model has been effectively related to the Nicene homooHsion,
reflecting unitary, interactive relatedness, identity-in-difference. And
so too is such a stratified model reflective of the incarnate
Word-inscripturated Word relationship. At the "lower level,"
historical Scripture is the written, preserved record of revelation, the
"derivative" Word of God, by means of inspiration. As such, it
stands in, under, of, and from Jesus Christ. Its truth is not simply in
itself but, as "open up" unitarily in and under Christ by the Spirit, its
truth is ultimately grounded in Christ the ontological Word, i.e., in
the Logos, and so finally in the perichoretic relations of the triune
Godhead. Then also the inscripturated Word is "disclosive down"
and within the present historical space-time situation of humanity.

l _"":'

65See the discussion in three works by Thomas Torrance, Christian Theology and
Scientific Culture (Oxford University Press, 1980) e.g., p. 12; Ground and Grammar of
Theology (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1980) 11, 105; and Divine and

o~' (Chio,d, 'M",d Un;v,~;1y p"". 1981).
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To lose this aspect or "pole" of the unitary Word of God is to
disengage God's truth from history, to "transcendentalize" the
Word. Content-ful (propositional) revelation is negated. This is the
inevitable outcome of such disjunctive, dualistic, separationist
thinking. As Ray Anderson has said,
What is at stake in giving up that which a concept of propositional
revelation seeks to preserve is the pole of transcendence which we
have said lies in history and thus can serve to inform the act of faith
"in the Spirit" of its transcendent grounds in the person of Christ
... if the cognitive link with the content of God's transcendence as
historical act is broken, the act of faith must supply its own content
to the divine Word. 66

It is this very historical, content-ful revelation, as grounded by the

Spirit in Christ, which is apparently cut away by those forms of
theological thinking analyzed earlier.
Significantly, something akin to this very "stratification" of the
written Word of God in, under, and from Christ is reflected in John
Calvin's understanding of the Word of God. Historically, according
to Calvin, the written Word of God stands "over" the church, i.e., it
is, in Einsteinian terms, "disclosive down" as the derivative/inspired
Word of God to be heard and known here and now P

66Ray S. Anderson, Historical Transcendence and the Reality of God: A Christological
Critique (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975) 213.
67See this writer's article, "John Calvin's Christological Assertion of Word
Authority in the Context of Sixteenth Century Ecclesiological Polemics," The Scottish
Journal of Theology 45/4 (1992). Again note Packer's critique, noted previously in n. 49.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

